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In December 1990, the Shanghai Securities E",-
change, China's first recognized stock exchange,
officially opened; a few months later, in April
1991, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange opened.
Since then, equity prices in these emerging mar-
kets have taken a roller coaster ride. For example,
at the end of1991, Shanghai Fello Shareholding
Co./ ltd., had a price/earnings ratio of 538.7 and
was considered the most overpriced stock in the
world; then, in mid-1993, the stock markets
started to spiral down, and by July 1994, some
indices had lost about 70 percent oftheir value.
In this Weekly Letter, we examine the perform-
ance ofChinese securities markets and their de-
velopment. In moving from a centrally planned,
state-owned economy to privateownership of
economic resources, Chinese policymakers
clearly face challenges as they strive to build
their financial markets arid evolve the appropri-
ate institutions.These challenges often involve
complex links among foreign investment, regula-
tion, commercial banking/and securities markets.
The Chinese stock markets: background
After the exchanges opened on an experimental
basis, the government established the China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission in 1992 to reg-
ulate and supervise them. Only a very small
fraction (less than 1 percent in 1991)ofthe en-
terptises that have converted to shareholding
companies are listed onone ofthe exchanges.
Firms chosen to be listed in these two exchanges
have to show at least two years of satisfactory
profitbefore getting listed. As a result,com-
panies seeking tolistanone oflheexchanges
may have to wait afevv years. Duringthisperiod,
illegal black markets often emerge for trading
shares of these unlistedcompanies. These black
markets typicallydisappear when thesharehold-
ing companies get their stocks listeo inthe stock·
exchanges.
The process ofprivatizing the government-owned
enterprises and start-'up firms requires that they
be established as shareholding companies (some-
times referred toas joint-stock companies). Shares
in these firms are sold topublic investors, employ-
ees,legal·entities (other firms) andthe govern-
ment. Typically, the shares held by legal entities
and government represent more than 50 percent
ofthe total stock capitalization. This provides a
mechanism for the government to retain control
in theprocess of liberalizing and privatizing the
finanCial sector of industry.
Currently, only shares held by individuals maybe
betraded on stockexchanges. Governmentshares
are neither tradable nor transferable. Legal
shares can be traded among enterprises them-
selves only and some ofthem are officially
traded through two electronic trading systems
(NET or STAQ) administered by the China Se-
curities Trading System Co., ltd. (CSTS). Initially
foreign investors were excluded from owning
shares in the Chinese shareholding companies.
Trading in individual shares was limitedtoChi-
nese citizens; these sharesllave beenreferred to
as A-shares.A secondclass ofshares, B-shares,
was created in February 1992 exclusively for.
foreign investors;.B-shares are a vE;!hicle to attract
foreign capital and to facilitate transfers oftech-
nologyand management skills toChinese enter-
prises.pnlike A-sharesthat traeje only in the
Chinese currency Renminbi or yuan, B-shares
are traded in U.s. dollars on the Shanghai Se-
curities .Exchange and in I-I0ngKong dollarson
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. .
The volatility ofChinese stocknlarkets
Figures 1. and 2.showthemol1thly A-shareand
B-shareindexmovements from 1992 to 1994.
When tile stock.Illarkets firstdeveloped,the tre-
mendous buying pressure fromspeculative .inveS~
tors caused market prices to skyrocket,w.hile the
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B-snares. These are effectively identical claims
on the assets of the firm, yet they are traded in
different currencies and are held by different
market investors. The existence of B-shares in-
dicates thatauthorities find it desirable to attract
foreign investment. However,tnemethod of
achieving this has led to a segmented market,




1400 number of individual investors registered with
the Shanghai Securities Exchange increased from
30,000 in 1991 to 4.6 million in 1993. Some have
suggested that the high prices and surge in par-
ticipation reflected investors' belief that stocks
would be very stable and would continue to rise
in price because the Chinese government gener-
ally holds at least 50 percentofcompanies' shares.
Then, the stock markets started to spiral down
in mid-1993. For example, the Shanghai Com-
posite Index started at 364.7 in February in 1992,
peaked at 1,358 in April 1993, and dropped to
334 byJuly 1994-a loss of about 75 percent of
its value compared to its peak. The Shenzhen
Composite Indexdropped nearly the same pro-
portion-about 72 percent from its peak. The
high level of volatility caused many investors to
become wary about this market and move their
money to safer investment avenues, such as bank
depositsand state bonds. A Wall Street Journal
article (July 22, 1994) reported that individual
savings at China's state-run banks increased by
40 percent in the first halfofthis year, even
though interest on deposits wasonlyhalfthe
20percent national inflation rate.
As Figures 1and 2 illustrate, A-shares have been
much more volatile than B-shares, and, for the
most part, A-shares have been valued far above
B-shares; for a time they moved closer together,
but since August 1994, they have once again
moved far apart. One explanation suggested for
the lower volatility of B-shares is that they are
allocated to foreign investors, who are argued to
have more experience, since they typically have
capital invested in more developed markets. Ad-
ditionally, B-shares are traded in hard currencies,
like Hong Kong dollars and u.s. <Jollars; since
A-shares are traded in RMB; many investors fear
they might depreciate in value due to the high
inflation in China.
Regulatory restrictions on the development
of securities markets
The complexity andlack of comprehensive.P91-
ides related to a number of securities markets
institutions haveaddedto the uncertainty in the
securities. market. Specifically, these policiesare
related to the (a) convertibility ofthe Chinese
currency, (b) se~mented foreign ownership of
stock, (c) the role of banks in financing the se-
cl;lritiesnl.9rkets,~nd.(d) changes. jnthe institu~
tional features ofthe market. . .
The eff~ctof nonconvertibHityand segmentation
of shareholders on stock market uncertainty can
be seen in the development of A-shares andB-share markets. They find evidence that A-share
prices incorporate news faster than do B-share
counterparts. They suggest that this may reflect
differences in market settlement procedures the
two markets use. An alternative explanation in-
volves differences in each market's investors. The
Securities MarketHerald (issue 2-3 1994) notes
that in February 1994, the average number of
shares per transaction was 773 for A-shares and
17,330 for B-shares. This evidence may be taken
to reflect one market for small investors and one
market for larger investors. Studies of initial
public offerings in other markets often suggest
that small investors frequently have lower quality
information than larger investors. The pricingof
A-shares relative to Bcshares also may reflect the
fact that Chinese investors have more limited in-
vestment alternatives than do foreign investors.
For example, to the extent that Chinese citizens
face lower yielding alternatives, the price of
A-shares would tend to be bid up relative to
B-shares. Thus, while foreign investment is de-
sired in China, the mechanism for achieving it
while still limiting its influence leads to a market
where two identical claims on the firms assets
(shares) can trade at different prices.
Additional complications exist related to the re-
form of the banking system. The role of bank
credit in a developing market economy cannot
be overstated. In China, banks lend to businesses
to finance their operations. However, since the
businesses also can trade in each other's shares,
the government became concerned that many
bank loans might be used for speculative pur-
poses. Some firms borrowed money from banks
to pay dividends despite poor earnings; as a re-
sult, they had high price/earnings ratios. Concern
over this behavior and the speculative fever it
helped create led to a prohibition against banks
extending credit to participants in securities mar-
kets. The contraction of credit to finance pur-
chases also resulted in higher market uncertainty
and accentuated the price decline.
More recent uncertainties injected into the mar-
ket relate to rumors of combining ofA-shares and
B-shares and unifying legal, government, and in-
dividual shares. B-share markets tend to respond
more positively to these possibilities, since such
changes may increase their access to markets
with higher liquidity.>However, as the Chinese
currency RMB is still not freely convertible,
the uncertainties assqciated with the feasibility
ofthis unification leave investors' sentiment
unpredictable.
Also contributing to volatility in these markets
are rumors related to a possible policy change
that would allow legal and government shares to
be listed and traded together with the individual
shares. Investors feared this would create a huge
supply of shares in the market and exert down-
ward price pressure. This is evidence that in-
vesting decisions in the A-share market are not
based on the earnings potential ofthe companies
themselves.
China differs from most countries with developed
securities markets in that regulators and other
government agencies select firms that can list
various types of shares on the markets. Initially,
the government planned a rapid increase in the
listing of new companies. However news ofthis
led to fear that the supply of new shares would
tap capitalfromexisting markets and cause a
decline in share prices. The recent government
announcement of banning all new issues and list-
ings for the rest ofthe year resulted in a record
high volume in August 1994. Overall, this evi-
dence suggests that uncertainty and changing
government policy have contributed to the level
of stock market volatility.
Conclusions
Judging from the current market conditions, it
may take some time before the stock markets in
China reach the stage of mature and efficient
markets. The high volatility in these markets can
be traced at least partly to uncertain regulatory
policy. Even though many securities laws have
been developed since the China Securities Reg-
ulatory Commission was established in 1992,
many stillare evolving and are subject to sudden
change. Until a more comprehensive Securities
Act is released and investors aretrading in a more
certain environment, high volatility in the stock
markets seems to be inevitable. The case of
China provides a usefulillustration ofthe need
for securities regulation and the impact of inter-
dependencies between policies related to foreign
investment,commercial banking, monetary pol-
icy, and securities markets.
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